The Report of the Carnegie Commission on Higher Educa tion1is the most recent of a series of evaluations to highlight the acute shortage of medical manpower (doctors, dentists, nurses and so forth) .2 To meet the future needs of this country, the report strongly recommends that the number of medical school entrants should be increased from the present 9,000 to 15,300 by 1976, and to 16,400 by 1978. Such an increase should be accompanied by an average expansion of approximately 39-44 f cent in existing and developing schools by 1978. Also, the nber of dental school entrants should be increased to at least 30 by 1976, and to 5,400 by 1980.® More critical for the present, the Commission recommends that university health science centers consider the development of programs to train physician's and dentist's assistants.4 For although the physician shortage is certainly one of the factors responsible for the crisis in the provision of medical care, it is important to recognize that at least part of the shortage may be functional, that is, attributable to the extraordinarily inefficient manner in which health manpower resources are currently being employed. One commentator has gone so far as to suggest that the major problem today is not the paucity of physicians but rather the improper use of health manpower.5 It is becom ing more apparent that there must be a dramatic change in the 99 organization of health care systems to free the doctor from many tasks that can be just as effectively performed by other types of health personnel. 6 One of the major impediments both to the optimal utiliza tion of existing categories of health personnel and to the de velopment of new categories of auxiliary workers, is the body of state professional licensure laws.7 Once the Supreme Court, in the late nineteenth century, had removed the laissez-faire doc trine of freedom of contract from the area of health care, medi cal practice acts were passed in all the states.8 When written, these laws served as a means of regulating the human input into the health care delivery system by protecting the public from incompetent and unethical practitioners. The statutory mech anism of the practice acts granted a duly licensed physician an unlimited scope in the practice of medicine, and created a gen eral prohibition on the practice of medicine by any other in dividual. Gradually, as other categories of medical professionals emerged, organized and exerted leverage upon the legislative process,% series of limited, narrowly defined scopes of practice were eked out of the general prohibition. As each new category took on the status and prestige of licensure, it in turn resisted the effort to be licensed of new groups that threatened to en croach upon its own perimeter of practice.9
It is not surprising that this mechanism has proved to be rigidly unresponsive to the sweeping technologic advances in medical care and to the huge increase in demand for health services resulting from the population explosion and societal recognition that adequate health care (subsidized by the state if necessary) is a right of every citizen.10 What is more, the practice acts have not accomplished what they were originally intended to do-that is, maintain a minimum standard of prac titioner competence. Nowhere in the statutes governing phy sicians, nurses and other professionals are there provisions re quiring the licensee to submit the periodic re-examination or to a program of continuing education in his specialty as a con dition for maintaining licensure.11
The draftsmen of the statutes did not foresee the tremendous explosion in medical knowledge beginning in the 1930's and continuing into the present, which has since subjected many a medical technique to the possibility of rapid obsolescence. To day, the renewing of licensure is a rubber-stamp procedure. 12 No one would question that the doctor shortage could at least be mitigated by delegating those routine tasks traditionally reserved for the physician to qualified persons lower in the health care hierarchy. However, were the patient to sustain an injury at the hands of a physician's substitute and elect to bring a lawsuit for damages, two legal doctrines may come into play that hardly favor either the physician or his assistant. The first is the respondeat superior ("let the master respond") doctrine, which allows the patient to recover from the physician for the injurious actions of his negligent employee. The second is the "negligence per se" rule, which provides that mere violation of the terms of the statute is an inference of negligence or is con clusive on the issue of negligence.13
The consequences of delegation are even more severe if the delegatee is unlicensed. Under the practice acts, the delegatee would be criminally liable for the unlicensed practice of medi cine and the professional could be prosecuted for aiding and abetting the unlicensed practice of medicine.14In a civil suit, of course, the unlicensed delegatee could not rely upon whatever presumption of competence a licensed worker might enjoy by virtue of his occupation's having been recognized by the legisla ture.
The problem of delegation is further complicated by the fact that the statutory language delineating a particular profession or occupation's scope of practice does not provide the physician with a "bright-line" distinction between what is within a sub ordinate's scope of practice and what is without. It is immensely difficult to apply the vaguely worded statutory terms of the vari ous scopes of practice to complex modern-day treatment pro cedures that have been shaped by rapid technologic advances unforeseen at the time the statutes were enacted.
Thus, the uncertainty of the statutory language and the ever present threat of civil, if not criminal, liability combine to pro duce a detrimental chilling effect upon any physician inclined to reallocate tasks among old and new categories of medical personnel in furtherance of the social policy of expanded medi cal care. 16 Another feature of the practice acts that impedes the flexible utilization of manpower is commonly referred to as vertical (career) immobility.16 Each licensed category of health person nel has its own set of formal educational requirements. The unlicensed aspirant, or the already-licensed worker wishing to move up to a more responsible position, may well find that his own education or experience is deemed inadequate or irrelevant to the new position, and that therefore he must undertake a costly and time-consuming formal educational program to qualify. The mechanism of the present state licensure laws also results in what is commonly referred to as horizontal (career) immobility,17 or the power of one state medical board to refuse recognflion of another state's license. A physician who has re ceived a license in one state may not be permitted to practice medicine in an adjoining state.18 Of course, to some extent 48 states provide some mechanism for recognition, be it through endorsement of another state's licenses (based on equivalent standards) or reciprocity (equivalence plus reciprocal recogni tion by both states). Yet, as shown by the Health Manpower Report, in 16 of the states all endorsements of licenses are under the control of the licensing board at its discretion, and only eight states endorse all the licenses of all other jurisdictions.
The impact of restrictions upon recognition of other states' licenses affects not only the extent of territorial coverage of the physician, but also the extent of authority for delegation of re sponsibilities. Consequently, a physician's assistant would like wise be prevented from providing complete medical coverage to a rural area spanning state boundaries. And, despite intense pressures for change because of the shortage of physicians, little evidence is found of significant modifications of recognition policies, although there appears to be some liberalization of the reciprocity requirement as shown by the increasing number of states that have granted discretionary authority to licensing agencies for endorsing licenses of nonreciprocating states. 19 Of the proposed alternatives to the practice acts in their present form, one planning model has been advanced that ad dresses itself specifically to the shortcomings of the state manda tory licensure system recounted above. That model, first put forth by Nathan Hershey20 and later modified by Dan Mc Adams21would give state institutional licensing bodies the au thority to establish job descriptions for various positions in the health care institution. The job descriptions would be broadly defined so as to provide the institutions with some flexibility for employing individuals in accordance with their self-per ceived manpower needs.
To the extent that the Hershey model shifts the regulatory focus from the individual practitioner in the abstract to the individual in the context of his institutional function, it comple ments two other recent trends in the reorganization of the health care delivery system: (1) the growing tendency of medi cal care institutions to have attributed to them characteristics of responsibility and liability that have traditionally been as cribed to the individual practitioner; and (2) the move toward national standards of care, as indicated by recent malpractice case decisions and by bills currently before Congress proposing national programs of health care. Both warrant separate ex amination to understand the impetus they provide for a radical alteration of present licensure laws.
Despite its compatibility with these important trends in the organization of health care, the Hershey model should not be viewed as more than an interim measure. To appreciate why this is so, it is helpful to think in terms of "evolutionary stages" of health manpower regulation, defined and differentiated in terms of the regulatory mode peculiar to each stage. Though it has been 70-odd years since the demise of the freedom of con tract doctrine, manpower regulation cannot be said to have passed beyond its first evolutionary stage. That stage is charac terized by its reliance on the screening of human inputs into the health care delivery system as the sole means of maintaining quality control in the practice of the healing arts. The Hershey model perpetuates this traditional reliance on input regulation; it does not, therefore, capitalize upon the results of recent re search involving the entirely different idea of quality control that, when perfected, will enable manpower regulation to move into its second evolutionary stage. With the help of applied computer techniques, medical scientists will be able to quantify what were formerly crude and unsystematized articulations of treatment outcomes (outputs). Such a method of quality con trol portends radical reorderings not only in the manpower re gime but also throughout the health care system of which it is a component. Because of its emphasis on the institutional con text, the Hershey model provides an excellent bridge between the first and second evolutionary stages of manpower regula tion. The point that needs to be stressed about the Hershey modelAparticularly in light of the fact that aspects of it have been included in the comprehensive health care bills now before Congress-is that it is transitional, no more and no less. Truly comprehensive and long-range planning for this nation's health needs must recognize the benefits to be derived in terms of flexibility from the output-measurement method of quality control.
ALTERNATIVE MODELS
Because of the inadequacies of the present licensure system, the following proposals have been suggested for reforming it:
1. Modifying existing personnel licensure laws to provide for increased task delegation and periodic re-examination of health personnel. 2. Establishing a national qualifying board to set national standards, administer national examinations and thereby eliminate the present "chaos of state's rights."22 S. Abolishing personnel licensure for a scheme of institu tional licensing. The first recommendation, that of strengthening existing state laws, can be achieved through exemption clauses that "loosen up" requirements for delegation of responsibility by the physician, and provisions that require re-examination and continuing education. This will result at best in mitigating the onerous aspects of respondeat superior on the full utilization of medical manpower, and in an improvement of consumer protection, but will fail to resolve other critical restrictive fea tures of mandatory licensure-i.e., rigid categorization of per sonnel, and vertical and horizontal immobility.
The second proposal seems much more in keeping with con temporary trends toward national standards of care.23 Besides improving the protection of the patient against incompetent care, a national scheme would eliminate the problems of hori zontal immobility that are inherent in individual state licens ure. However, it is unlikely that a national licensure of person nel per se will resolve the restrictive effects of rigid categoriza tion of personnel, vertical immobility and physician liability under the respondeat superior doctrine. Therefore, its overall effect would probably be to hinder the optimal utilization of health manpower.
The last recommendation, that of merging the two kinds of licensing-personnel and institutional-into one system, devel oped out of an awareness of the incompatibility of personnel patterns established by licensing legislation and those most ad vantageous to the institutions for providing patient care. Nathan Hershey worked out the first principal model for this new type of licensing. In his proposal, Hershey recommends that health services institutions be invested with the responsi bility for regulating health care within limits determined by a state institutional licensing agency. This agency would be em powered to establish in broad terms with the advice of health care experts, "job descriptions, including required education and work experience for specific hospital positions."24
The Hershey proposal is an improvement over the existing system of licensure for two reasons. First, more flexibility is provided for manpower innovation. Laws are difficult, if not impossible, to change at a rate consistent with necessary altera tions in the use of health personnel. Here an agency can define the job descriptions of the institutional personnel and more easily modify the descriptions to meet new institutional needs. It has been suggested that the Hershey proposal would invest the institution with the role of "doer" in determining the dis tribution and quality of health care.25 Although the institution enjoys a decidedly more active role in this system, nevertheless, it can hardly be equated with that of a "doer" for the state in stitutional licensing agency actually establishes the job descrip tions and required qualifications with which the institution must comply.
Second, the possibility exists for circumventing the liability to physicians resulting from respondeat superior. Inasmuch as the health care institution is given major responsibility for decidin^which personnel will perform which functions, it would appear reasonable to hold the institution responsible for the negligent acts of its employees. In fact, a natural consequence of this proposal might be the development of an institution-based compensation mechanism for patients injured while being treated by the institution. Such a scheme would operate in much the same manner as a workmen's compensation system, in which the negligence of the institution need not be established because specific injuries are compensated for in accordance with fixed payment schedules.26
By the same token, the following important problems remain unresolved:
1. Horizontal immobility: according to Hershey institutional licensure would remain a state function. In fact, because each state institutional licensing agency will establish its own pattern of job descriptions, the proposal actually compounds the legal difficulties of moving across state boundaries.
2. Consumer protection: no provision is suggested that would counteract the educational obsolescence that is not pre vented by the existing state laws, unless one can assume that the institution as employer will be in a position to act against individual incompetency. Even so, the stan dards of care would most likely be defined on a state-by state rather than on a nationwide basis. 3. Despite the ease of altering job descriptions, the proposal may actually continue the problem of vertical immobility engendered by the licensure laws, unless the interrelation between the "institution" and the educational system were such as to facilitate personnel in obtaining necessary train ing for increasing levels of responsibility within the institu tion. Recognizing some of the unresolved issues in the Hershey proposal, Dan McAdams made a major modification while re taining the basic structure of institutional licensure.27 He sug gested employing a private agency, such as the Joint Commis sion on Accreditation of Hospitals (j c a h ) , to assume the role (establishing job descriptions including required education and work experience) Hershey gave to the "state institutional licensing bodies." This private agency, representing all health occupations, would function in effect as a national qualifying mechanism, and thereby provide for the horizontal mobility that is the primary advantage of a national licensure code.28 In addition, such an agency would assure the competency of practitioners by continually reviewing the credentials of par ticipating health care personnel.29 Perhaps the main concern McAdams has with his recommendation is that such an institu tionally based (private) agency as j c a h would not guarantee the competence of practitioners who do not operate within an institutional setting.30 This could be remedied if some mech anism were constructed that would essentially tie all health personnel into an institutional structure.31
The Hershey-McAdams institutional framework for licensure seems to be the most promising for meeting present health needs. As will be explored in the next section, it will be possible in the near future to improve upon the institutional paradigm with a system that reflects the rapidly developing technology in the monitoring of the output of health care as a method of quality control. However, before assessing the impact of this development, considering the close association of the Hershey-McAdams pro posals with the emerging trends toward the institutionalization of liability, and the establishment of national standards of care, it would be appropriate to examine these trends.
TWO CONVERGENT TRENDS IN THE ORGANIZATION OF THE HEALTH CARE SYSTEM

Institutionalization of Liability32
The trend toward the institutionalization of liability is most evident in several recent court cases. In the past most state courts drew a distinction between medical and administrative acts asli means for determining hospital liability. The rationale for this differentiation is twofold: that a hospital functioning as a corporation could not practice medicine in the traditional sense, and that the trained professional was an independent con tractor and not "controlled" by anyone.33Therefore, a hospital could not be held derivatively responsible for the negligent acts of its professional employees, though it could be so held for "ad ministrative negligence."34 But, the medical-administrative dichotomy is being increas ingly ignored.35 The hospital is becoming more and more liable36 either under the theory of corporate negligence (a re sult of selecting or retaining incompetent employees; negli gently maintaining its equipment and buildings; or for furnish ing defective equipment or supplies) ,37or that of vicarious lia bility for the acts of its individual employees (physicians, nurses). With regard to the former, the Darling case33in 1965 extended considerably the scope of corporate negligence by holding the hospital liable for violation of duties it owes to the patient.39 In this now-famous case an 18-year old male was treated for a fractured leg at the emergency ward of a commun ity hospital. A general practitioner working in the emergency ward treated the patient by applying traction and placing his leg in a cast. After a few days passed the patient complained frequently of severe pain (caused by circulatory impairment from compression) and the odor of decayed tissue was observed. But necessary attention was delayed until amputation of the leg was required.
Legal action was brought against the hospital;40 and, although the general practitioner was not employed by the hospital, the institution nevertheless was found liable for allowing an un qualified doctor to perform orthopedic surgery, and for not requiring consultation or review of treatment. Interestingly, the court permitted the application of standards on consultation re quirements in the regulations of the state hospital licensing agency, in the hospital's own bylaws, and in the private stan dards of expected care promulgated by the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals.41But, the most important feature of this case is the redefinition of the role of the institution in the practice of medicine. The court was not suggesting that the hospital must actually control the medical practice of the phy sician.42 Instead, the decision emphasizes the joint responsibili ties of physician and institution for the standards of patient care, and thus refutes the antiquated notion that a corporation cannot practice medicine.43 Subsequent decisions on corporate negligence have generally followed the holdings in the Darling case, and have often added innuendoes of interpretation. For example, in Fiorentino v. Wenger, the New York Appellate Court stated that an institution may be liable if the administra tion knows, or should know that a physician is departing from acceptable modes of care.44
The second type of liability that is increasingly attributed to the hospital is vicarious liability under the doctrine of re spondeat superior. This trend particularly demonstrates the shift away from the notion of the physician as "Captain-of-the-Ship" toward that of the institutionalization of liability; and, concomitantly, an expanded interpretation of medical practice wherein the institution is viewed as the primary provider of care.45The case of French versus Fisher illustrates this new de velopment.46 In this case, a scrub nurse incorrectly counted the number of sponges following an abdominal operation on an infant. After a few days the child became critically ill, and it was necessary to operate and remove two-thirds of the child's small intestine because of the presence of a sponge. Under the traditional "Captain-of-the-Ship" doctrine, the surgeon would have been held liable for the nurse's negligence. However, the court abandoned this doctrine and found the hospital liable.
The shift of liability from the physician to the hospital in volves another aspect of liability in addition to respondeat su perior; i.e., the determination of accepted standards of care. Kapuschinsky versus U.S.47 demonstrates the use of this deter minant of liability, which has often been employed against physicians. In this case the government was found negligent for allowing an inexperienced Wave who had not been subjected to proper physical examination to come in "critical contact" witha premature baby. As a result the baby contracted staphylococcus infection of the hips, which caused residual injuries. The court ruled that it was no defense for the hospital to argue that the accepted standard of care is that prevailing within the com munity (the locality rule), and allowed a medical expert from outside the area to testify.
As the next section will explain, a similar move from the "locality" principle to national standards for physician practice has been operating the past several years.48 The parallels be tween evaluations of standards of care expected of physicians and those of institutions, and the obvious transfer of respondeat superior from physician to institution are striking evidences of the institutionalization of medical liability.
National Standards of Care
Augmenting the impact of the move toward the institutional ization of liability on the development of an institutional frame work of licensure, is an equally forceful trend toward the de lineation of national standards of care. Perhaps the most signif icant manifestations of this trend are: 1. The development by the National Board of Medical Ex aminers of national examinations for determining the qualification of physicians to practice. 2. Recent court decisions involving medical malpractice that refute the traditional locality rule for acceptable standards of care. 3. Emerging proposals (bills) for a national program of health care. Regarding the first of these manifestations, it is sufficent to say that these examinations are being accepted by virtually all the states in lieu of individual state qualifying examinations, and probably will eventually replace the state exams alto gether. 49 Recently several court cases involving medical malpractice have refuted the "locality rule" and advocated the application of national standards of physician care. One of the most im portant landmark cases is Brune versus Belinkoff,50 which was decided in 1968. In this case a specialist in anesthesiology ad ministered a high dosage of pontocaine as a spinal anesthetic to a pregnant woman. Many hours after the birth of her child the patient attempted to get out of bed, but because of numbness and weakness in her left leg she fell and injured herself. At the trial a specialist from Boston testified that the dosage of ponto caine administered was excessive, but the court charged the jury to apply the locality rule. The Supreme Court of Massa chusetts, on the other hand, upheld the introduction of this testimony51stating that the proper standard is not whether the physician has exercised the level of care acceptable in the local ity in which he practices, but rather that care and skill of the average qualified practitioner taking into account medical ad vances and available resources.52
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The Brune versus Belinkoff case, and the line of cases that followed supporting this holding, are final breaks with the out moded past.53But, from a more progressive viewpoint, they are also forerunners of a new trend that is attempting to define in a very broad sense a national concept of acceptable medical care.54
The last significant manifestation to be discussed is that of the current proposals for a national program of health care. These proposals are efforts to use specific payment methods to alter and expand the organization and delivery of health ser vices. Two of these "bills"55 in particular-"Health Securities Program" (S. 3: Kennedy Bill), and "National Health Insur ance and Health Services Improvement Act of 1971" (S. 836: Javits Bill) -provide specifically for the implementation of "na tional standards" for health personnel. The "Health Securities Program" explicitly renders restrictive state licensure laws in operative in determining the eligibility of otherwise qualified physicians and other health personnel for the program.56 In addition, this bill provides for the establishment of national standa*ls for participation of both individual and institutional providers of health services,57and authorizes the Health Security Board to set requirements for the continuing education of health personnel.58
The "Javits Bill" is similar to the "Kennedy Bill" in setting national standards, though it has no explicit provision to negate the state licensure laws. However, the "Javits Bill" does author ize the Secretary to prescribe requirements for participating physicians in the sections entitled as follows:
"A. Standards of continuing professional education B. National minimum standards of licensure ...59 C. Adherence to the standards for continuance in the pro gram."60 In effect this authority circumvents the restrictions of the state licensure laws, and is not unlike that granted the Secretary in the Social Security Amendment of 1971 (Sec. 239, "Payments to Health Maintenance Organizations") .61 This provision in-vests the Secretary with the capability of defining national stan dards, but, unlike the "Javits Bill," it does not specify the re quirements the Secretary can impose.62
It is quite likely that some national program of health will be enacted in the near future. Significant premonitory evidence of this is the recent passage of the Emergency Health Personnel Act of 1970.63This new law will expand the scope of activity of the Public Health Service by allowing health professionals (doctors, dentists, nurses) to enlist in the Service for the pur-^ pose of dispensing medical care in areas where demand is high, ; such as the rural areas and urban ghettos. Those participating in the Service will be paid on a salary basis by the federal gov ernment and be assigned at the discretion of the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare. In effect, this act is a major step toward the nationalization of the medical care system be cause it provides government involvement in direct health ser vices to population groups long felt within the exclusive prov ince of the private practice of medicine.64 All three of these signs of a shift toward national standards of care, along with those regarding changes in the role of the institution in medical care, strongly support a dynamic altera tion of state licensure policies. Logically, for a new licensure policy to be compatible with these trends, it would have to emphasize the primacy of the health care institution within a nationwide context. Of those being considered at the present time, the Hershey-McAdams proposal, seems to be the one that most likely fulfills these objectives. But, as discussed earlier, it merely perpetuates the traditional reliance on input regulation and, therefore, does not recognize the important developments in outcome-measurements of health care.
. THE CASE FOR NONLICENSURE
' ( The solutions presented thus far for affording societal control over the quality of health services have continued to stress the regulation of the inputs into medical care by some form of licensure. Of these proposals, the Hershey-McAdams recommen dation seems basically compatible with both the discernible trends toward the institutionalization of liability and national standards of care, and the growing need for a system that allows for a more flexible allocation of duties among health personnel. As a result, the institutional framework of licensure is presently the most acceptable plan for resolving many of the issues affect ing the regulation of health care. However, one of the most critical events of the contemporary medical scene has not been considered, and that is the introduc tion of computer technology. The computer has already been successfully applied to various medical tasks. It is used in diag nostic tests such as automated readings of electrocardiograms, image processing, chromosome analysis, retinograms, mammo grams and electroencephalograms; and, in therapeutic activities such as monitoring cardiac patients, and delivering anesthesia during surgery. Now, because of the computer, it will be possi ble to monitor accurately the output of medical care, an ac complishment that will undoubtedly revolutionize the entire health care system.65
In an unrefined way output determinations have been opera tional in hospitals for several years, conducted by such groups as tissue and infection committees, utilization review commit tees and medical record and audit committees. The function of these groups has been to evaluate the changes in the patient's condition during his hospitalization to assure high standards of performance in the delivery of care. Assessments of care have unfortunately been predicated on imprecise criteria and are accordingly expressed in broad terms-either descriptively, or as the degree to which actual outcome approaches expected out come, or as an accounting of the patient's maintenance, gain or loss of status.66 However, much research is being conducted on arriving at an operational definition of health status that will provide some criteria for establishing meaningful output determinants. For example, it has been proposed that a defi nition for health status might be worked around the notion of "function/dysfunction" based on one's ability or inability for carrying out the usual daily activities appropriate to individual social roles.67 Alternatively, it might be based on a scale of classification of "impairment," that is along a continuum from "no impairment" to "bedridden" and "death."68 It is expected that within the next four to five years an operational definition of "health status" will have been sufficiently researched to serve as the basis for developing output determinants. 69 The computer is actually forcing a realignment of medical information into more sophisticated organized patterns that will be far more objective and quantifiable. The clinician is being compelled to improve the standardization of medical pro cedures by developing methods "for becoming more consistent in designating, more uniform in recording and more reliable in verifying symptoms and signs that are main units of clinical measurement."70Lawrence Weed at the Cleveland Metropolitan General Hospital has developed one of the most thoughtful approaches to organizing medical information in a manner that would be readily adaptable to computer requirements, and pro vide a more rational method for patient management. Weed recommends orienting the data of patients around each medical problem, so that as the data develop the findings can be "crystal lized" into specific diagnoses that require particular therapy. Over time the "problem-oriented" medical records would result in an amount of data from various patients around specific problems sufficient enough to ensure that new "standards for reasonable numbers of tests and good care will emerge."71 Once standards are so delineated, it would be relatively easy with the computer to set up methods for appraising the perfor mance not only of the individual practitioner, but also that of the health care institution. A computer could be programmed to screen large amounts of data for evidence of inadequate care (diagnosis, treatment and so forth) and thereby provide infor mation for monitoring the quality of care. This is already being done on a limited scale in several institutions throughout the country, and it is felt that the capability exists now for expand-ing computer usage to the point where it will assume the pri mary role in the regulation of health care. 72 The implementation of a computerized nationwide yet re gionally based network for monitoring the quality of care of medical institutions would dynamically alter the utilization of health manpower. No longer would professional licensure, or "input" regulation be needed; for now it would be possible to regulate the end-product of elements, professional and in stitutional, that interact in the care of patients. Input regula tion is at best an indirect attempt to control the output of the medical care process. From the societal standpoint it serves no other function and consequently would be rendered obsolete by the development of a reliable mechanism for regulating out put.
Although having some features in common with the HersheyMcAdams institutional framework for licensure, the theoretical model of a system of output monitoring would depart in signif icant ways from that framework. Emphasis in the proposed model would be on the institution as the responsible agent for providing care, on the use of national rather than state stan dards of care and on the freedom for employing various mixes of health personnel to meet individual institutional and com munity needs. But, in addition, this shift of attention from "input" to "output" would have a radical impact on three crucial components of medical care: (1) consumer protection, (2) medical "professionalism" and (3) medical education.
With regard to "consumer protection" the results of a system of output regulation would be most favorable. Standards for acceptable care would have to be established on a national basis and applied through regional organizations against the "output" of individual institutions. The monitoring itself could be con ducted by a private agency, which would work closely with both professional medical societies (representing all health person nel) , and the federal agency responsible for financing the care. One could reasonably conjecture that the primary sanction against the institution providing inadequate care would possi-bly be ultimate loss of "certification" by the regulatory agency, and concomitant withdrawal of federal support.
Consumer participation would also likely be an important feature of this new system. Each institution would be forced to establish its own "regulatory" body that would periodically evaluate the activities of its health personnel in the light of current needs. Such a committee should consist of representa tives from the various medical professions as well as members of the community. This regulatory committee, to respond to the requirements of the nationwide agency, would be em powered to impose sanctions on individual practitioners who are performing inadequately. Such sanctions might take the form of requiring additional education or, in the extreme, revising an individual's job description. And, the last aspect of consumer protection would be some means for compensating injuries incurred from the institution's care. Because the in stitution rather than the individual would be the provider of care, it would be liable for the negligence of its personnel. A natural resolution of this problem might be the implementation of some national insurance compensation scheme analogous to workman's compensation that would recompense the injured party for the institution's negligence.
The second essential component of health care that will be affected by the shift to "output" regulation is the professional identity of medicine. The salient characteristic of a profession that distinguishes it from other occupations is that society has invested it with a "legitimate" autonomy, the right to determine both who can perform its functions, and how.73 Licensure has served a pivotal role in shaping the contours of the medical pro fession. Though conceived as a method for protecting the health consumer, licensure as an operating system has been forced to rely heavily on the expertise of licensed members of the profes sion, so that it rapidly became a powerful instrument for creat ing an elite that has been able to effectively exclude others from its scope of activities.
The important issue now is whether licensure of medical personnel is still essential for the preservation of a professional identity. It is probably not that important, for the "core" char acteristics that define the profession-specialized training in an "abstract" discipline, and a collective orientation to servicewill survive without licensure.74 The effects of "nonlicensure" might be the converse, that is that more emphasis will be appro priately placed on the educational features of the profession as reflected in the quality of performance, which will enhance the sense of identity and "collectiveness." The physician would con tinue as the director of the health care team. However, oppor tunities would be provided for vertical mobility whereby particular health workers (e.g., technologists, nurses) could conceivably, through continuing education or apprenticeship, climb a "ladder" of progressive responsibility. Throughout the medical care professions, the proper allocation of responsibili ties as determined by medical training and competence should introduce significantly more incentive than has licensure for achieving optimum performance.75 Fina'ffy, the medical curriculum will undergo profound re visions as a result of the use of computer technology in medical care. This will occur primarily for two reasons. First, the com puter's capabilities for rapid and accurate retrieval of medical information will make the current need for enormous accumu lations of facts essentially superfluous. The student will be free for the first time to pursue other disciplines of increasing im portance to the institutional practice of medicine, i.e., the social, economic and behavioral sciences, as well as the humanities (particularly ethics) .76 And, second, the multitudes of social, economic and medical factors that will converge at every major medical decision will require specialized personnel capable of understanding the intricate processes of "medical" decision making. The overall impact, therefore, will be a changing of emphasis from basic medical research to the perplexing issues of health services.
For the other members of the health care team, formal educa tion will probably be geared closer to that of the physician, especially for the first few years. Even now universities are ex perimenting with such innovations as the development of a "core" curriculum for pharmacists, physician assistants, nurses and others.77The advantage of upgrading the education of other health professionals is that they will be competent to be em ployed with greater flexibility.
CONCLUSION
It is generally agreed that the present state mandatory licens ure system, with its rigid delineation of functions for each of the respective health professions, does not allow the flexibility in manpower utilization that is required in expanding current health resources to provide comprehensive health care for every citizen. One suggested alternative to the present licensure laws, the Hershey-McAdams model, offers greater flexibility in man power use by allowing the manpower classifications to be de fined by, and in terms of the needs of, the health care institution. The Hershey model has the added advantage of complementing the general trend toward the institutionalization of health care (and the legal liability therefor) and the nationalization of the standards of that care.
Because of its sole reliance on input regulation to control the quality of practice-the trademark of the first evolutionary stage of manpower regulation-the Hershey model cannot jetti son all the constrictive features of licensure. Notwithstanding its shortcomings in this respect, its institutional emphasis en ables it to serve as a bridge between the first evolutionary stage of regulation and the second, the latter of which is characterized by primary reliance on the measurement of treatment outcomes to achieve quality control. Recent advances in the quantification of these outcomes, or "outputs" of the health care system, enable medical scientists to predict that such a quality control mechanism will be widely operational in five years.
Viewed in this perspective, the legislative proposals currently before Congress, which contain structural components similar to the Hershey model, are the blueprints of short-range plan ning only. Long-range planning to meet vastly increased con sumer needs requires the drafting of legislation that will in corporate the free-form innovations of quality control through outcome measurement in a system of "nonlicensure." 
